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HOW WILL I KNOW? AN AUDITING PRIVILEGE AND
HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE†
ABSTRACT
The current complexities of the False Claims Act and the Affordable Care
Act have impacted the rise of government enforcement of fraud and abuse laws
within health care entities. Yet this rise in enforcement does not adequately
address efforts focused on preventing unintentional violations from occurring.
For this reason, the current health care regulation landscape calls for an
additional strategy to reduce fraud and abuse violations: establishing a
compliance audit privilege.
This Comment analyzes the peer review privilege established in the Patient
Safety Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA), which established a
privilege for data collected to improve patient safety, and suggests that a
compliance audit privilege fulfills a similar goal. Although there are several
differences between patient safety data and compliance audit data, this
Comment argues that such differences should not preclude Congress from
enacting a compliance audit privilege because compliance and patient safety
have compelling similarities. The PSQIA and compliance audits both aim to
improve quality and compliance through proactive efforts collecting data,
performing ongoing root cause analyses, and encouraging a culture of
openness within a health care entity. Because of these similarities, the benefits
seen from the PSQIA privilege are likely to be experienced in improved
compliance if a compliance audit privilege is recognized.

†

This Comment received the 2015 Mary Laura “Chee” Davis Award for Writing Excellence.
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INTRODUCTION
Health care in America is in a state of transformation. The rise of
technology is transforming the doctor–patient relationship,1 the Affordable
Care Act is transforming the way health care is provided and paid for,2 and the
focus on quality of care is transforming the way health care is measured.3
However, throughout this time of change, the desire to create an efficient,
affordable, and effective health care system has remained constant.
One way to improve efficiency, affordability, and quality in our health care
system is to ensure all health care entities4 have robust compliance programs.
Compliance with federal regulations promotes efficiency and affordability
because it protects against wasteful or fraudulent spending; compliance also
improves quality by streamlining disease management systems, reducing
medical malpractice incidents, and improving data privacy.5 One crucial
component to compliance programs is compliance audits; auditing provides a
comprehensive review of a health care entity’s compliance program, including
evaluation of compliance policies, identifying and managing risk, and
recognizing areas for additional personnel training.6
However, the recent rise of False Claims Act (FCA) enforcement has
stifled efforts to promote robust internal compliance audits because health care
entities fear these types of audits are discoverable in potential future litigation.7
This Comment argues that the current lack of privilege for compliance audits
creates an unnecessary barrier to improving health care costs and quality.
Because the predicted quality improvements facilitated by a privilege outweigh
1 Jen Hyatt, Tech Will Transform the Doctor-Patient Relationship, HEALTH SERV. J. (July 14, 2014),
http://www.hsj.co.uk/home/innovation-and-efficiency/innovation-network/tech-will-transform-the-doctorpatient-relationship/5072505.article.
2 Key Features of the Affordable Care Act by Year, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/timeline/timeline-text.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2015).
3 See Max Nisen, How One of America’s Largest Health-Care Providers Prepares for Obamacare and
the Future, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 18, 2013, 1:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-american-healthcare-is-changing-2013-9.
4 For the purposes of this Comment, a health care entity means “a hospital; an entity that provides health
care services . . . [or] a professional society . . . that engages in professional review activity . . . for the purpose
of furthering quality health care.” 45 C.F.R. 60.3 (2015).
5 See D. Scott Jones, Quantifying Compliance and Quality: Understanding the Economic Impact of
Inadequate Care, 10 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, May–June 2008, at 41, 41; Health Information Privacy
and Security: A 10 Step Plan, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/ehr-privacysecurity/10-step-plan.
6 See infra Part II.A.
7 See infra Part II.B.
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the need for the information to be discoverable in potential future litigation,
Congress should legislate a privilege for compliance auditing.
Health care entities have much to fear in potential future litigation due to
the government’s zealous enforcement of the FCA.8 The FCA was enacted
after the Civil War and creates liability for anyone who submits a fraudulent
payment claim to the government.9 Since that time, the FCA has grown in
complexity and has been utilized to enforce multi-million dollar penalties and
settlements against health care entities for submitting such fraudulent payment
claims.10
For most FCA violations, actual knowledge of a violation is not required to
establish liability.11 While intentional fraud continues to occur, the
government12 is also aggressively enforcing the FCA against unintentional
mistakes that result in FCA liability.13 As a result, a hospital entity may be
subjected to enormous penalties for a violation it had no knowledge of,
regardless of good faith efforts to comply with the complex array of
regulations.14
Unintentional violations are distinctly different from intentional fraud
because unintentional violations are often the result of negligence, confusion in

8

See infra Part I.D.
See, e.g., John M. Degnan & Sally A. Scoggin, Avoiding Health Care Qui Tam Actions, 74 DEF.
COUNS. J. 385, 385–86 (2007) (discussing FCA enforcement in health care actions).
10 See, e.g., Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government
Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 124 & n.2 (2001) (noting that “federal health
care programs are governed by an enormous number of legal provisions, spanning hundreds of thousands of
pages”). “[The] recent proliferation of fraud cases can be blamed on [the] fact ‘that healthcare regulations have
just become too complicated to understand.’” Id. at 124 n.2 (quoting Uwe E. Reinhardt, Opinion, Medicare
Can Turn Anyone into a Crook, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2000, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB948408802553884631).
11 See CHRISTINA W. FLEPS, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2:1, Westlaw
2015 WL 9482445 (C.C.H.) (database updated Dec. 2015) (citing Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(f), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified at Social Security Act § 1128B(h), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(h) (2012))) (noting that the Affordable Care Act amended the criminal intent required to violate
Anti-Kickback Statute “by amending Section 1128B of the Social Security Act to state that a defendant does
not need specific intent to violate [the statute]”).
12 For the purposes of this Comment, “the government” refers to the Executive Branch, which includes
government agencies and the Department of Justice, which represents such agencies in litigation.
13 See David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, Social Norms, and the Trust
“Reposed in the Workmen,” 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531, 531–32 (2001) (noting that “health care fraud and abuse
control is a booming industry”).
14 See Reinhardt, supra note 10.
9
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a statute’s application, or simply a difference in interpreting a regulation.15
Because of these complexities, compliance programs provide important
ongoing oversight to reduce negligence and confusion, as well as to identify
areas of problematic interpretation.
While the threat of liability is a powerful incentive for health care entities
to avoid both intentional and unintentional violations, aggressive enforcement
and huge penalties are unlikely to be as effective for unintentional mistakes as
for intentional fraud.16 Unlike intentional fraud, unintentional acts are likely to
be conducted by entities already trying to comply with the law.17 Without
ongoing compliance oversight, it is likely that unintentional FCA violations
will continue to occur, costing the government and ultimately the taxpayer.18
However, while it is critical for health care entities to institute robust
compliance programs, the current adversarial relationship between the
regulated entities and the government regulators impedes this goal. Although
health care entities already spend significant resources on compliance
programs,19 health care providers remain fearful of reporting potential
violations to compliance officers because health care providers continue to
view such officers as adversaries.20 Therefore, efforts to lessen fear and create
a more cooperative relationship between the government and health care
entities have become a necessary reality.21 This Comment will explore the
15

See Krause, supra note 10, at 209–10 (noting that “[w]hile ‘the criminal law has little reason to fear
overdeterrence . . . within its appropriate domain,’ the same cannot be said of civil laws such as the FCA” and
arguing that “it is precisely when health care providers’ conduct falls within a regulatory gray area . . . that
punitive penalties are least appropriate” (first ellipsis in original)).
16 See Hyman, supra note 13, at 543 (noting that many physicians convicted of Medicaid fraud had not
believed they had been doing anything wrong and further noting the tension between regulation and
professional norms in the medical community).
17 See id.
18 See Reinhardt, supra note 10.
19 See AM. HOSP. ASS’N, PATIENTS OR PAPERWORK? THE REGULATORY BURDEN FACING AMERICA’S
HOSPITALS 11 (2006), http://www.aha.org/content/00-10/FinalPaperworkReport.pdf.
20 See Michael Miscoe & Alicia Shickle, Group Practice Liability Under the False Claims Act:
Minimizing Liability Through Implementation of an Effective Compliance Program, in AHLA HEALTH CARE
COMPLIANCE RESOURCE GUIDE 3, 6 (2014), https://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/2014/
Documents/Fraud_advertorial_2014.pdf (“Unfortunately, a compliance officer is often seen as an adversary,
and where this is the case, a compliance officer often gets little help detecting non-compliance or potentially
fraudulent conduct from other employees.”).
21 See generally Terry Puchley, Mitchel Harris & Aysha Long, How Health Care Organizations’ Risk
and Compliance Executives Can Become Strategic Board Advisors, in AHLA HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 20, at 31, 31–35 (“Being on the front end of strategy-setting allows risk and
compliance officers to proactively engage leadership rather than being brought in on the back end to change or
remediate the fallout of unadvised decisions.”).
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establishment of a privilege for compliance auditing, which is but one tool to
promote such openness and cooperation.
This Comment is divided into five parts. Part I describes recent FCA
violations within the health care context and explores the recent increase of
government enforcement of these violations. Part II then illustrates several
ways that compliance auditing is likely to identify current FCA violations and
to prevent future FCA violations from occurring; it then discusses potential
conflicts with discoverability of audit reporting. Part III describes existing
privileges in FCA actions, concluding that existing privileges are unlikely to
provide meaningful protection to compliance audits. Part IV explores a current
federal privilege for patient-safety data under the Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act. Part V discusses the differences and similarities between
patient-safety efforts and compliance, and concludes that the benefits
associated with the patient-safety privilege are likely to benefit compliance in a
similar way. Finally, Part VI explores challenges unique to compliance and
concludes that, while unlikely to solve all fraud and abuse problems, such a
privilege will significantly decrease FCA violations and improve overall
compliance for health care entities.
I. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT WITHIN THE HEALTH CARE CONTEXT
This Part will describe the False Claims Act and recent trends in
government enforcement of the Act. This Part will then discuss the differences
between intentional and unintentional acts that result in FCA violations and
suggest that fear of liability may not be an effective deterrent for unintentional
mistakes. This Part concludes with an analysis of two especially complex fraud
and abuse laws, the Stark Law and the Anti-Kickback Statute, and an analysis
of how the Affordable Care Act has impacted these laws.
The FCA is a federal statute that imposes liability on a person or entity that
submits false or fraudulent payment claims to the government.22 In the health
care context, a program that bills the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS)23 for any services not permitted by CMS regulations is in

22

31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012).
While CMS is the most common payer, programs that bill other government entities such as
CHAMPVA, CHAMPUS/TRICARE, Federal Employee Health Care Program, and other federal health care
programs can also create FCA liability. See Anti-Kickback Statute and the Stark Law, BERNSTEIN LIEBHARD
LLP, http://www.bernlieb.com/whistleblowers/Anti-Kickback-Statute/index.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
23
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violation of the FCA.24 This includes billing for services not actually provided,
misrepresenting services or treatments provided, or services or treatments that
are defined by CMS as not medically necessary.25
A. Current Government FCA Enforcement Methods Risk Regulatory Disorder
The government enforces FCA violations in two ways: the government
may bring a FCA action against an entity or individual, or it may intervene in a
private individual’s case against an entity or individual.26 A private individual,
called a relator or whistleblower, may bring a civil action against an entity or
individual for violating the FCA on behalf of the United States under the
FCA’s qui tam provisions.27 The United States can intervene in such an action
and assume primary responsibility, or the relator may proceed with the action
if the government declines to intervene.28 Private individuals have a strong
financial incentive to file qui tam actions; if the government intervenes, a
relator may share in 15%–25% of the award and may receive 25%–30% of the
award if the government does not intervene.29 This incentive has been touted as
24 See Joan H. Krause, “Promises to Keep”: Health Care Providers and the Civil False Claims Act,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1366 (noting that “[a] health care provider that breaches its promises to the federal
government, yet seeks payment as if it had fully performed, engages in a form of health care fraud”); Lonie
Kim, Comment, Am I Liable? The Problem of Defining Falsity Under the False Claims Act, 39 AM. J.L. &
MED. 160, 161 (2013). For an in-depth discussion on the Medicare claims submission and reimbursement
processes, see Richard Doan, The False Claims Act and the Eroding Scienter in Healthcare Fraud Litigation,
20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 49, 53–55 (2011).
25 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
26 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3730.
27 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). The term qui tam comes from the Latin phrase, “qui tam pro domino rege quam
pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur,” which means, “who as well for the king as for himself sues in the matter.”
Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
28 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B), (c)(1). Although this Comment does not specifically discuss the impact of
privilege when the government does not intervene in a FCA case, health care entities are forced to combat
more potential increases in liability when courts allow relators to have privileged documents that they would
not otherwise be allowed to access. In United States ex. rel. King v. Solvay S.A., the court held that relators
could add factual allegations to their amended FCA compliant, even though the facts came from documents
subpoenaed by the government while the case was under seal. No. H-06-2662, 2010 WL 2851725, at *1
(S.D. Tex. July 20, 2010); see also Marisa Lorenzo, District of Massachusetts to Determine Whether Relator
May Amend Complaint with Documents Subpoenaed by the Government, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 16, 2011),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f2744ad8-4388-4671-b257-13301f83574c.
Similarly,
in
United States ex rel. Banigan v. Organon USA Inc., a district court in Massachusetts held that, although the
government ultimately decided not to intervene, a relator could use information obtained by the government
through a government subpoena to bolster the relators’ complaint. No. 07-12153, 2011 WL 794915, at *1–2
(D. Mass. Feb. 28, 2011); see Lorenzo, supra.
29 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2). Compare William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private
Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15–16 (1975) (describing an economic model of competitive,
profit-maximizing private enforcement and arguing that the incentives in private enforcement result in
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an important tool for government enforcement, but it may also result in
excessive enforcement.30 When considering the incentives and the optimal
quantity of litigation from a law and economics analysis, excessive
enforcement occurs when the costs of controlling socially undesirable acts—in
this case, violating the FCA—is greater than the social benefits associated with
reducing the undesirable act from occurring.31 Said another way, excessive
enforcement occurs “when the violator of a legal rule suffers excessive harm—
or more harm than is necessary for optimal deterrence—from the actual
implementation of that rule.”32 Excessive enforcement is a concern because it
risks regulatory disorder.33 Disorder can result from “‘excessive unchecked
discretion in enforcement authorities’ and the . . . ‘inevitable disparity among
similarly situated persons.’”34
Regardless of whether an individual brings a FCA case or if the
government intervenes, increased enforcement is unlikely to promote optimal
compliance because this type of enforcement is unlikely to effectively alter
behavior in all contexts.35 Although behavior is partially influenced by the
threat of litigation, a more cooperative relationship between regulators and the
regulated industry is likely to make oversight more effective and, therefore,

excessive levels of enforcement), with David Kwok, Evidence from the False Claims Act: Does Private
Enforcement Attract Excessive Litigation?, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 225, 237 (2013) (arguing that private litigation
is unlikely to have a significant enforcement impact on alleged FCA violations). According to DOJ published
data, between 1987 and 2009, “only 239 out of 3,920 non-intervened cases resulted in a settlement or
judgment in favor of the United States, a 6% success rate,” but when DOJ intervened, 1,076 of the 1,134 cases
“resulted in a settlement or judgment in favor of the United States, a 95% success rate.” Kwok, supra, at 237.
30 See Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public Enforcement:
The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 300 (2007) (analyzing the Government’s
enforcement behavior under a moral hazard theory, the author argues that because “the Government may rely
upon the relator . . . to absorb [litigation] costs by prosecuting on the Government’s behalf,” “the Government
prosecutes or allows the relator to prosecute excessive numbers of FCA cases that the Government alone
would not bring”). For a thoughtful economic analysis of the impact of private enforcement actions, see also
Landes & Posner, supra note 29.
31 See Isaac D. Buck, Enforcement Overdose: Health Care Fraud Regulation in an Era of
Overcriminalization and Overtreatment, 74 MD. L. REV. 259, 264 (2015) (noting that we currently have an
“enforcement framework that not only over-captures individual providers, but fails to appropriately
differentiate providers whose misconduct and individual level of culpability varies”); Steven Shavell, The
Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 225, 261 (1993); Joel P. Trachtman & Philip M.
Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway?,
44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221 (2003).
32 Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1744 (2005).
33 Buck, supra note 31, at 270.
34 Id. (quoting Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags
to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 749 (2005)).
35 Krause, supra note 10.
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better promote a healthy system of proactive and ongoing compliance.36 This
impact can be inferred from the different motivations behind intentionally
criminal FCA violations and unintentional violations.37 The following section
will first describe three common unintentional FCA violations. The section
will then argue that when entities unintentionally submit false claims, a
compliance program is a better tool to prevent future errors than are traditional
enforcement mechanisms.
B. Unintentional FCA Violations Are Less Likely to Be Influenced by Current
Enforcement Strategies
While there have been numerous examples in the news of willful and
intentional health care fraud,38 a health care entity can unintentionally violate
the FCA in many ways. For example, if a staff member responsible for billing
is unaware that his or her medical license has expired, there can be a finding of
fraud even if the services were properly rendered.39 If a physician is absent
when he or she is required to be in the same room to oversee the performance
of a service, which is then billed to CMS, there could be a FCA violation.40 If a
patient’s services are billed on an outpatient basis—but the patient received a
service CMS has identified only as an inpatient procedure—this discrepancy
may also trigger a FCA violation because CMS has regulated that certain
inpatient procedures are not medically necessary for patients receiving
outpatient treatments.41

36 See Buck, supra note 31, at 313 (“By employing a random and seemingly disordered enforcement
framework, federal prosecutors have risked further stoking tension between medical and legal industries, and
instead, may actually be deterring beneficial conduct. . . . [I]t seems time for a recalibration of health care
fraud enforcement—one focused on a cooperative enterprise . . . .”).
37 See id.; see also Krause, supra note 24, at 1386 (noting that “[b]ecause of the complexity of federal
health care program reimbursement requirements,” health care entities are proactively seeking legal and
compliance advice from consultants, accountants, and other advisors).
38 See, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold, A Medicare Scam that Just Kept Rolling, WASH. POST
(Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/08/16/a-medicare-scam-that-just-keptrolling/ (describing “the wheelchair scam” where criminals “ginned up bogus bills, saying they’d provided
expensive wheelchairs to Medicare patients” who actually did not need them); see also Krause, supra note 10,
at 124 (noting that “anti-fraud rhetoric now pervades the national health care debate”).
39 Greg Freeman, 6 Ways to Avoid Unintentional Medicare Fraud, HEALTH LEADERS MEDIA (Jan. 30,
2014), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-2/HEP-300516/6-Ways-to-Avoid-Unintentional-MedicareFraud.
40 See id.
41 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Georgia Hospital to Pay $20 Million to Resolve False Claims
Act Allegations (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/georgia-hospital-pay-20-million-resolve-falseclaims-act-allegations.
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These types of mistakes or unintentional violations42 more often reflect
improper compliance oversight and human error, rather than malicious fraud.43
In these unintentional situations, because health care entities do not intend to
participate in fraud, it is likely that improving compliance oversight, rather
than simply increasing punishments through regulatory enforcement, will
decrease FCA violations.44 The following section discusses two important laws
related to FCA: The Stark Law and Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS).
C. The Stark Law and Anti-Kickback Statute: Additional Tripwires for Entities
The continued unintentional FCA violations are due in part to the fact that
the laws regulating health care entities are extremely complex and have
changed and continue to change over time. In addition to general violations of
the FCA, there are two regulations the government has particularly focused on
in recent enforcement activities: Stark Law violations and AKS violations.45
1. The Stark Law: Regulatory Landmines for Health Care Referrals
The Stark Law prohibits physicians from referring Medicare or Medicaid
patients for designated health services46 to entities that the physician has a
42 Another growing area of regulatory enforcement under the FCA is “overtreatment” or “medically
unnecessary treatment.” See Buck, supra note 31, at 276 (noting that “federal prosecutors have increased their
focus on providers who . . . have allegedly administered overtreatment”). This is different than the
unintentional violations discussed in this Comment because often “overtreatment results from the divergence
between clinical decision-making and government or insurance-created standards” and therefore may be
simply a difference in medical opinion rather than mistakes. Id. at 277. It would seem that the unintentional
mistakes discussed in this Comment are likely to be more easily corrected through compliance programs than
overtreatment issues.
43 See Miscoe & Shickle, supra note 20, at 5 (noting that “provider groups must take deliberate steps to
reduce FCA exposure . . . . because physician groups can be directly liable for their own failure to prevent
submission of false claims”). But see Doan, supra note 24, at 57 (discussing how the “sheer complexity of the
Medicare and Medicaid systems” makes it especially difficult to “distinguish[] between fraud and mistake,”
which suggests that “[p]roviders can easily manipulate complex rules . . . to [purposefully] submit improper
claims”).
44 Compliance programs are directly aimed at reducing FCA violations. See, e.g., Miscoe & Shickle,
supra note 20; John P. Kaisersatt, Note, Criminal Enforcement as a Disincentive to Environmental
Compliance: Is a Federal Environmental Audit Privilege the Right Answer?, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 405, 409
(1996) (noting that “both regulators and the regulated community favor the promotion of compliance through
self-auditing”).
45 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012); see also Tony R. Maida & Sara Kay Wheeler, Stark and Anti-Kickback
Enforcement Actions: Investigation and Settlement, AHLA-PAPERS P09250626 (AHLA Seminar Materials
2006) (noting that “[f]inancial arrangements between hospitals and physicians have become the subject of
intense legal and regulatory scrutiny”).
46 Designated health services include: (1) clinical laboratory services, (2) physical therapy services,
(3) occupation therapy services, (4) radiology services (including MRIs, Ultrasounds, and CAT scans),

PARDUE GALLEYSPROOFS2

1148

4/18/2016 2:26 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1139

direct or indirect financial relationship with, unless an exception applies.47
Additionally, the Stark Law prohibits entities from billing claims to CMS for
these inappropriately referred services; if they are billed, they can then be the
basis for a FCA violation.48 The Stark Law is a “highly technical statute with
numerous technical statutory and regulatory exceptions.”49 These complexities
are compounded due to the numerous changes to the law in the past twenty
years.50 In addition to these changing complexities, the Stark Law does not
require intent, which means that health care entities are held strictly liable for a
violation even if they did not know or intend to violate the law.51 It is therefore
unsurprising that Stark Law violations are a significant part of federal health
care enforcement activities.52 On one hand, higher enforcement of the Stark
Law suggests that many entities are violating the law and therefore greater
enforcement is required, but on the other hand, entities may simply be easy
targets for Stark Law enforcement solely because the sheer complexity of the
law makes it easy for the government to identify a violation and therefore
obtain settlements.53

(5) radiation therapy and supplies, (6) durable medical equipment and supplies, (7) parenteral and enteral
nutrients, equipment, and supplies, (8) prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies, (9) home
health services, (10) outpatient prescription drugs, and (11) inpatient and outpatient hospital services.
42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (2014).
47 Physician Self Referral, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/index.html?redirect=/physicianselfreferral/ (last visited Feb. 13,
2014). For a discussion on the various exceptions to the Stark Law, see, for example, Scott Becker, Ji Hye Kim
& Jessica L. Smith, 11 Key Concepts from the Stark Law, MCGUIRE WOODS, https://www.mcguirewoods.com/
news-resources/publications/health_care/11%20Key%20%20Concepts.pdf.
48 Physician Self Referral, supra note 47.
49 Claire Turcotte, Keeping Clients Compliant with Stark and Other Health Care Laws, in HEALTH CARE
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE at *2, Westlaw 2011 WL 4454656.
50 See, e.g., Stark I Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,914 (Aug. 14, 1995); Stark II Proposed Rule, 63 Fed.
Reg. 1,659 (Jan. 9, 1998); Stark II, Phase I Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 856 (Jan. 4, 2001); Stark II, Phase II,
Interim Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 16,054 (Mar. 26, 2004); Stark II, Phase III Final Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 51,012
(Sept. 5, 2007).
51 Turcotte, supra note 49, at *4–5 (noting “increasing tension between the long-standing idea of the
Stark Law as bright-line, strict liability statute and the notion of intent”).
52 See, e.g., id. at 4 (noting “that the government has begun to recognize the[] advantages of bringing a
Stark Law claim to support its FCA case” because the Stark Law lacks any element of intent and “require[s]
only proof by a preponderance of the evidence,” as opposed to criminal law, which requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt); see also Ben A. Durie, Halifax Case Signals Greater Stark Law Enforcement, HOOPER,
LUNDY & BOOKMAN, PC (May 1, 2014), http://www.health-law.com/media/pubperspect/263_Durie%
20Web%20Version.pdf (describing several recent FCA Stark Law Cases, including Halifax, Tuomey
Healthcare System, and Bradford Regional Medical Center, and several “future high-profile cases on the
horizon”).
53 See Buck, supra note 31, at 270 (noting that “[i]n the case of overenforcement, ‘if almost the entire
community is guilty of some crime, . . . [t]he question of why a particular individual was selected becomes . . .
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2. Anti-Kickback Statute: How the ACA Created Greater AKS Liability
AKS is a criminal statute that forbids any entity or individual to knowingly
or willfully exchange anything of value in an effort to induce the referral of
federal health care program business.54 For example, feeding the homeless or
providing free transportation to a clinic could be considered an AKS violation,
if providing meals or improving access to services encourages individuals to
seek continued treatment at the hospital.55 In this example, a provider could be
held personally liable for violating AKS, along with the health care entity that
bills the government reimbursement for services that violate AKS.56
Although the interpretation of the knowingly or willfully intent requirement
has “generated significant controversy and contradictory court rulings,”57 the
ACA makes clear that actual knowledge of an AKS violation or the specific
intent to commit a violation of the AKS is no longer necessary for
conviction.58 The ACA also clarified that any claims submitted to the
government as a result of an AKS violation could trigger liability under the
FCA.59 For example, if a health care provider had a relationship with a
pharmaceutical company that violated AKS, all claims submitted from that
debatable’” (alteration in original) (quoting Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization,
36 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 715, 752 (2013))).
54 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012).
55 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 39; Michael F. Schaff & Alyson M. Leone, OIG Provides New
Guidance on Free Transportation, AM. HEALTH LAW. ASS’N (2009), https://www.wilentz.com/files/
articlesandpublicationsfilefiles/165/articlepublicationfile/schaff_physorgsjuly09-reprint.pdf (cautioning that
while “free transportation may have important and beneficial effects on patient care, it may also be a part of
fraudulent or abusive schemes that lead to inappropriate steering of patients, overutilization, and the provision
of medically unnecessary services”).
56 See Schaff & Leone, supra note 55.
57 FLEPS, supra note 11, § 3:1; see also Patrick J. Miller, Health Reform Is Not Just Insurance Reform:
Significant Changes in Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 53 ADVOC., Oct. 2010, at 28, 29 (“The ACA . . .
provides that a person may violate the anti-kickback statute even if such person did not know the anti-kickback
statute existed and did not specifically intend to violate the anti-kickback statute.”).
58 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k; see also JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22743, HEALTH
CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE LAWS AFFECTING MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: AN OVERVIEW 5 (2014) (“[T]he
government may still have to prove that the defendant knew that the conduct in question was unlawful, but not
that it was a violation of the anti-kickback statute per se. Still, it appears that the amendments made by the
ACA may make it easier for the government to prove an anti-kickback statute violation.”).
59 See 42 U.S.C. § 6402(f) (“In addition to the penalties provided for in this section . . . a claim that
includes items or services resulting from a violation of this section constitutes a false or fraudulent claim for
purposes of the [False Claims Act].”); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2015); see also United States ex rel.
Westmoreland v. Amgen, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 39, 54–55 (D. Mass. 2011) (citing an extensive list of cases
and noting that “courts, without exception, agree that compliance with the Anti-Kickback Statute is a
precondition of Medicare payment, such that liability under the False Claims Act can be predicated on a
violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute”).
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provider for a drug or service that was the subject of the AKS violation would
automatically create liability for the provider under the FCA, even if a patient
received a medical benefit from drug or service received.60 Additionally, there
are substantially more indictments of individual doctors under the AKS,
compared to indictments of individual doctors under the FCA for violations of
AKS.61
However, the individual physician often does not directly bill CMS.
Instead, the health care entity employing or contracting with the physician is
billing CMS, resulting in the health care entity submitting a false claim and
therefore risking liability under the FCA.62 This is important to the government
because individual providers usually do not have the assets to pay out the
damage awards the government normally seeks; the ability to sue the health
care entity under FCA for an AKS violation of an individual provider allows
the government to sue defendants with deep pockets.63 This may be changing:
a recently announced DOJ policy change, commonly referred to as the “Yates
Memo,” makes it clear the government intends to “combat corporate
misconduct . . . by seeking accountability from the individuals who perpetrated
the wrongdoing.”64 The increasing government enforcement effort, and its
impact on the adversarial relationship between government and health care
entities, is further discussed in the following section.
D. The Rise of Government Enforcement Has Exacerbated the Adversarial
Nature of the Relationship Between Health Care Entities and the
Government
The rise of enforcement of health care fraud in recent years has been an
intentional government effort to deter individuals and health care entities from
misappropriating public funds.65 This enforcement has created a significant
60 See, e.g., Nathan Trexler, Fraud and Abuse: Key Provisions in the PPACA, DEL. LAW., Spring 2013,
at 16, 17 (noting that “a claim submitted in violation of the AKS is necessarily a false claim under the FCA”);
see also Scott Oswald & David Scher, Health Care Law Expands False Claims Act Liability Under the AntiKickback Statute, 26 WESTLAW J. GOV’T CONT., June 11, 2012, at *1 (“Recent court decisions confirm that the
measure of damages in [AKS] fraud claims is the full value of the services provided, even though the patients
in question often receive the medical benefits claimed . . . .”).
61 See Oswald & Scher, supra note 60, at 2.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 3.
64 Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., to the Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust
Div., et al. (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download.
65 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3.8 Billion from False Claims Act
Cases in Fiscal Year 2013 (Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Press Release, $3.8 Billion], http://www.justice.gov/
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source of revenue for the government by successfully prosecuting FCA
allegations and collecting large settlements from health care entities.66
However, a purely aggressive “hyper-enforcement”67 may be promoting an
unnecessarily strong adversarial relationship between the government and
health care providers who are making a good-faith effort to follow the laws.68
The current adversarial relationship is promoted by the government’s
strong messaging efforts directed to the public about the government’s
monetary successes in enforcement actions.69 These enforcement efforts are
touted as large “return on investments”70 and a win for “the taxpayer and for
the millions of Americans, states agencies and organizations that benefit from
government programs and contracts.”71 Government officials have made it
clear they have “taken the government’s fight against health care fraud ‘to a
new level.’”72 In fact, in 2013, the government recovered $2.6 billion in health
care fraud, up from $1.7 billion in health care fraud settlements and
prosecutions just ten years previously.73
The Government has gone further and has arguably equated health care
fraud as a crime similar to drug trafficking, organized crime, and other
offenses that merit a strong government response.74 In fact, in May 2009, the

opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-38-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2013 (“The $3.8 billion in
federal [FCA] recoveries in fiscal year 2013, plus another $443 million in recoveries for state Medicaid
programs, restores scarce taxpayer dollars . . . . [and] is also a strong deterrent to others who would misuse
public funds . . . .”).
66 Id. (“The $2.6 billion in health care fraud recoveries in fiscal year 2013 marks four straight years the
department has recovered more than $2 billion in cases involving health care fraud.”).
67 David L. Douglass & Matthew M. Benov, Healthcare Fraud Enforcement After Healthcare Reform
(Or “More. More. More. How Do You Like It?”), 23 HEALTH LAW., Aug. 2011, at 35, 43.
68 See id.
69 See Press Release, $3.8 Billion, supra note 65.
70 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Departments of Justice and Health and Human
Services Announce over $27.8 Billion in Returns from Joint Efforts to Combat Health Care Fraud
(Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2015/03/19/departments-of-justice-and-health-and-humanservices-announce-over-27-point-8-billion-in-returns-from-joint-efforts-to-combat-health-care-fraud.html.
71 Press Release, $3.8 Billion, supra note 65.
72 Douglass & Benov, supra note 67, at 36 (quoting Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney
General Holder and Secretary Sebelius Team Up at Health Care Fraud Prevention Summit in Boston
(Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-and-secretary-sebelius-team-healthcare-fraud-prevention-summit).
73 Press Release, $3.8 Billion, supra note 65; Joan H. Krause, Healthcare Fraud and Quality of Care: A
Patient-Centered Approach, 37 J. HEALTH L. 161, 163 (2004).
74 See Michael Volkov, Healthcare Fraud: Aggressive Enforcement Strategies, VOLKOV: CORRUPTION,
CRIME & COMPLIANCE (Jan. 26, 2015), http://blog.volkovlaw.com/2015/01/healthcare-fraud-aggressiveenforcement-strategies/ (noting that the “continuing trend of aggressive civil enforcement . . . is being
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Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) created the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement
Action Team to investigate health care fraud.75 This team is referred to as
“HEAT” and uses “strike forces” of attorneys in multiple federal agencies
working in collaboration to aggressively prosecute fraudulent Medicare
billing.76 In addition, the Office of Inspector General (OIG)77 launched a “Most
Wanted Fugitives List” for individuals charged with health care fraud to focus
the public’s attention on individuals’ criminal efforts to intentionally defraud
the government.78 The message is clear: the government is making significant
efforts to decrease health care fraud by aggressively seeking legal action
against individuals and large entities that violate the FCA.
However, while the government has framed much of its messaging as
efforts to crack down on willful and malicious criminal fraud within the health
care system, often individuals who willfully defraud the government are
judgment proof.79 As a result, the government has a significant financial
incentive to aggressively pursue large entities with deep pockets for accidental
violations, rather than only focus on intentional acts that purposefully defraud
the government.
In many ways, this makes sense; from a revenue perspective, it may not
matter to the government and to the taxpayer whether an entity purposefully or
accidentally allows the government to improperly pay for services. But while
intentional crime may be best deterred through severe punishment and punitive
damages, unintentional violations are unlikely to be best deterred by the same
methods. On one hand, severe punishment will deter unintentional violations
because it will make the actors more careful,80 but knowledge is another
deterrence method to unintentional violations. Incentivizing entities to become
supplemented with new criminal prosecution schemes and tactics typically reserved for organized crime and
narcotics trafficking organizations”).
75 Douglass & Benov, supra note 67, at 42.
76 Id.
77 The OIG is a government agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The
OIG’s role is to “identify and eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse in HHS programs and to promote efficiency
and economy in HHS operations.” Maida & Wheeler, supra note 45.
78 Douglass & Benov, supra note 67, at 42.
79 Id.; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GGD-80-7, REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL: DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE SHOULD COORDINATE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL REMEDIES TO EFFECTIVELY PURSUE FRAUD IN
FEDERAL PROGRAMS (1979).
80 It is undeniable that large settlements and judgments against entities and individuals who are “made
examples of” to other entities promotes internal compliance efforts to prevent government scrutiny, potential
legal action, and a negative public image. See id.
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more knowledgeable about potential violations, rather than only relying on
prosecuting violations that have already occurred, is key to creating a healthy,
efficient, and affordable health system.81 One way to increase knowledge of
violations and to promote long-term compliance is through compliance
auditing;82 one way to incentivize auditing is to establish a legal privilege for
these audits.83 Part II explores why compliance auditing should be part of an
effective compliance program, and how a lack of privilege inhibits entities
from realizing the full potential benefits of a compliance program.
II. COMPLIANCE AUDITING: THE MOST EFFECTIVE DETERRENT FOR
UNINTENTIONAL FCA VIOLATIONS
Ongoing auditing is critical for a robust compliance program because
auditing can identify concerns before problems develop, address possible
existing violations in a timely manner, and encourage a culture of cooperation
within the entity and between the entity and the government.84 The recognized

81 See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wagonhurst, Janice A. Anderson & Nathaniel M. Lacktman, The Quality of Care
Cerberus: Payments, Public Reporting, and Enforcement, 20 HEALTH L., Dec. 2007, at 1, 7 (noting that
“[a]ddresing quality of care proactively, and integrating it with compliance, will place the [health care entity]
. . . on the cutting edge to meet pay-for-performance quality targets . . . [and] can prevent allegations of fraud
based on poor quality of care”); Top 10 Counseling Tips to Minimize Fraud Exposure in an Environment of
Heightened Scrutiny, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP (June 16, 2010), http://www.kattenlaw.com/files/
upload/Top-10-Counseling-Tips-to-Minimize-Fraud-Exposure.pdf (describing proactive ways an entity can
understand potential violations and policies to prevent violations from occurring).
82 The OIG has encouraged entities to develop robust internal compliance programs in order to
proactively investigate, correct, and prevent potential FCA violations. See OIG Supplemental Compliance
Program Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. 4,858 (Jan. 31, 2005). For example, in 2005, the OIG issued a
Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals. Id. The guidelines contain compliance
recommendations and discuss significant risk areas for hospitals to pay close attention to and recommends a
corporate structure that includes a robust compliance program. Id. This guidance is meant to promote
voluntary compliance and “may serve as a benchmark or comparison against which to measure ongoing efforts
and as a roadmap for updating or refining [hospital] compliance plans.” Id. OIG also uses Corporate Integrity
Agreements (CIAs) to encourage hospitals to settle allegations of fraud and abuse. See Maida & Wheeler,
supra note 45. Maida and Wheeler state that “CIAs are routinely administered in connections with OIG’s
settlement of a FCA investigation” and are used to “rehabilitate providers” by requiring providers to
“affirmatively agree to pursue specific remedial steps going forward to prevent the recurrence of alleged
improper conduct.” Id.
83 See Katheryn Ehler-Lejcher, The Expansion of Corporate Compliance: Guidance for Health Care
Entities, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1339, 1378–79 (1999) (“The primary goal of a corporate compliance
program is to prevent violations of the law.”).
84 See OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. at 4,858, 4,876; see
also HEALTHCARE MGMT. & AUTOMATION SYS., INC., SAMPLE HEALTHCARE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 1
(2010); Michael A. Dowell, Hospital-Physician Transaction Compliance Strategies to Address Recent Fraud
and Abuse Enforcement Actions, 16 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Mar.–Apr. 2014, at 5, 20 (“The
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benefits of an ongoing auditing program suggest it is an important mechanism
for improving overall compliance.85 However, these benefits may be stifled if
providers are fearful of openly discussing compliance issues; overall
compliance will be improved if a compliance audit privilege is recognized.
A. Auditing Improves Regulatory Compliance
The prevalence of inadvertent FCA violations strongly suggests that
compliance oversight cannot simply be based on goodwill and best efforts of
individual employees because entities and providers are often unaware
violations are occurring.86 Instead, a systematic approach that specifically
addresses problematic areas for potential violations is necessary for
compliance programs; identification of problematic areas can be done through
ongoing auditing.87
There is no single best hospital compliance program, as the OIG has
noted,88 but a strong program has certain important characteristics. This Part
will discuss three ways a compliance program can improve regulatory
compliance. First, strong compliance programs establish controls for physician
contracting. Second, standard checklists provide standardized processes to
protect against human error. Third, databases ensure necessary analyses are
conducted and documented.
First, on an entity-wide level, an audit will analyze the current system for
the physician contracting process and identify who is involved in negotiating
contracts.89 By identifying individuals who are directly and indirectly involved
in contract negotiations, an entity can better prevent inappropriate relationships
from occurring.
Second, after an audit of current employment contracts and other
hospital-physician transactions, an entity may identify areas of increased risk
associated with specific types of contracting, potential issues arising from
medical office leases, or even potentially improper medical education and
development and implementation of an effective compliance program that addresses hospital-physician
transaction compliance risks is the best way to address the recent fraud and abuse enforcement actions.”).
85 See Dowell, supra note 84, at 25.
86 See Miscoe & Shickle, supra note 20, at 4 (“[H]ospitals and health care provider groups face
substantial FCA liability as a result of the conduct of those employed . . . .”).
87 Id. at 5.
88 OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. at 4,859 (noting that
“[g]iven the diversity of the hospital industry, there is no single ‘best’ hospital compliance program”).
89 See Dowell, supra note 84, at 21 (discussing ways to manage hospital-physician transactions).
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teaching arrangements.90 Strategies to improve compliance may include
changing standard employment forms to include red flags if specific
information is likely to create a conflict, identifying higher risk contracting that
must be reviewed by legal counsel, or changing the way the health care entity
performs pre-payment and post-payment review of physician contracts.91
Checklists specifically tailored to the individual health care entity can provide
a standardized process to analyze financial relationships and to identify a risk
area before it becomes a violation.92
Third, databases can provide a reliable ongoing tracking system for all
agreements; auditing may identify the need to include specific input variables,
such as requiring a description of the need for services, or confirming legal
review and approval of certain arrangements.93 Tracking software can send
notifications if, for example, payments are made to a physician without a
current contract or if an agreement is about to expire and has not been
renewed.94
Recent AKS enforcement actions have been brought against health care
entities, alleging inappropriate compensations of health care providers and
other contracting arrangements.95 For this reason, various strategies should be
in place to identify and prevent these types of violations from occurring. For
example, health care entities should ensure that hourly wages for medical
personnel are based on Fair Market Value (FMV), and that loans and travel
expense reimbursements are properly performed and not in violation of AKS
or Stark Law.96 Auditing can reveal a possible need to ensure FMV analyses
and commercial reasonableness analyses are performed and properly
documented.97
For example, submitting a reimbursement claim for a service not actually
performed, or medication ordered but not picked up by the patient, constitutes
90

See id.
See id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 23.
95 See, e.g., Cooper Health Settlement Agreement, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/2013/Cooper%20Health%20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf
(noting problematic arrangements where hospitals allegedly provided services to physicians for free or less
than fair market value and allegedly compensated physicians at inflated rates).
96 See Dowell, supra note 84, at 18 (discussing Memorial Health Care System settlement, including
alleged medical office leases below FMV intended to induce physicians to refer patients to Memorial).
97 Id. at 22.
91
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a false claim.98 However, auditing can reveal if staff are not properly utilizing
the current system, which could suggest a need to alter the system or require
additional staff training. For example, if staff consistently “override” a prompt
that asks whether there was confirmation that medication was received, instead
of actually confirming the order, staff will need to be retrained on how to
confirm medication receipt and the importance of adhering to these types of
prompts.
B. Discoverability of Ongoing Auditing Discourages Fully Achieving the
Advantages of Compliance Programs
This section will discuss how the lack of protection for compliance audit
reports is a barrier for fully implementing ongoing auditing. The OIG strongly
suggests health care entities perform ongoing monitoring, which includes
daily, weekly, monthly and annual reviews for different types of compliance
issues.99 Additionally, the OIG has emphasized that a successful compliance
program can demonstrate to the government that a health care entity takes
compliance seriously and is making a good faith effort to comply with the
statutes and regulations governing health care.100
Because of this, there may be situations where a health care entity would
want to disclose to the government its ongoing reviews and reports to show
good faith effort and a robust compliance program.101 While there are
significant benefits to ongoing auditing, however, it comes at a cost to the
health care entity; not only in the time and resources required to conduct
audits, but also the legal risks associated with discovering and analyzing
potential violations identified through the auditing process.102 While being
proactive can advantage a health care entity because it prevents future
violations, entities remain concerned with the discoverability of documents

98

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. 4,858 (Jan. 31, 2005);
Affordable Care Act Provider Compliance Programs: Getting Started Webinar, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (June 26, 2014), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-LearningNetwork-MLN/MLNEdWebGuide/Downloads/MLN-Compliance-Webinar.pdf; see also Dowell, supra note
84, at 22.
100 OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. at 4,859.
101 For a more detailed discussion on when a health care entity may want to disclose information, and the
potential issue of subject matter waivers, see infra Part VI.
102 See Kaisersatt, supra note 44, at 419.
99
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created by internal auditing and the potential for these documents to be used in
criminal and civil actions against them.103
Although the discoverability of individual violations, such as identifying an
individual overpayment or an individual problem with a physician’s contract,
is of concern, far more concerning is the risk of not protecting internal controls
and potential risk assessments, or corrective action plans. The current
privileges in place, discussed in the following Part, are unlikely to protect these
analyses from discovery, potentially discouraging health care entities from
performing these types of in depth reviews.104 Therefore, a compliance
privilege is necessary.
III. THE CURRENT PRIVILEGES IN FCA ACTIONS PROVIDE NO PROTECTION FOR
COMPLIANCE AUDITS
If a health care entity is sued by the government or by a private individual
through a qui tam action under the FCA, generally all applicable documents
and reports are available for discovery.105 Although the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure “strongly favor full discovery whenever possible,”106 there
are certain exceptions to the rule, including work product privilege,107
attorney–client privilege,108 and peer review privilege.109 Unfortunately, these
exceptions to the general rule are unlikely to provide any meaningful
protection to compliance auditing.110 This Part will discuss work product
103

Id. at 406 (discussing environmental regulation enforcement and the role of internal auditing).
Id.
105 See Keith D. Barber, David B. Honig & Neal A. Cooper, Prolific Plaintiffs or Rabid Relators? Recent
Developments in False Claims Act Litigation, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 135, 161 (2004) (“One of the most
disturbing trends in false claims law for health care providers has been the filing of general allegations by qui
tam relators who hope to create a case through the discovery process. . . . which can include every claim
submitted to Medicare or Medicaid over a six-year period . . . .”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
106 United States ex rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 6:09-cv-1002-Orl-31TBS, 2012 WL
5415108, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2012) (quoting Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547
(11th Cir. 1985)).
107 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
108 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5); see also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795 (E.D.
La. 2007) (describing the five elements of the attorney-client privilege: (1) an attorney, (2) a client, (3) a
communication, (4) confidentiality anticipated and preserved, and (5) legal advice being the purpose of the
communication).
109 See infra Part V (discussing the Patient Safety Quality Improvement Act).
110 Additionally, because courts generally disfavor granting privilege, courts will narrowly construe
privilege and place the burden of proof on the party asserting its protection from discovery. See Baklid-Kunz,
2012 WL 5415108, at *3; In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:06-md-1769-Orl-22DAB, 2008 WL
1995058, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 2008).
104
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privilege, attorney–client privilege, and the peer review privilege. The
following Part will compare current peer review with compliance, concluding
that a new compliance privilege should be recognized.
A. Work Product Privilege Cannot Protect Ongoing Auditing Efforts
Work product privilege does not protect documents created in the ordinary
course of business, and is therefore unlikely to provide meaningful protection
to ongoing compliance auditing.111 Work product privilege provides protection
to any material created by a lawyer “in the course of his [or her] legal duties,
provided that the work was done ‘with an eye toward litigation.’”112 While it is
plausible to assert that all compliance activities are conducted for the purpose
of possible litigation, courts have not interpreted “in preparation for litigation”
so broadly.113 Instead, courts have limited the application of work product
privilege to only imminent litigation.114 Because compliance oversight and
auditing should be conducted on an ongoing basis in the “ordinary course of
business,” the work product privilege is unlikely to provide protection.115
B. Compliance Officers Cannot Invoke Attorney–Client Privilege
Courts are unlikely to grant attorney–client privilege to internal audits
conducted by compliance officers.116 Attorney–client privilege protects private
communication concerning legal representation between an attorney and his or
her client.117 This privilege has been interpreted not to apply to any other
advice, such as business advice or communication strategies.118 Given courts’
111 See John Calvin Conway, Note, Self-Evaluative Privilege and Corporate Compliance Audits,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 633 (1995).
112 In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 321 U.S. 495, 511
(1947)); see also Hager v. Bluefield Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 170 F.R.D. 70, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that
work product privilege applied to a legal opinion letter written by a law firm to a doctor regarding whether the
doctor’s employer’s billing practices violated AKS because it was written in anticipation of future litigation).
113 Conway, supra note 111, at 633.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 633–34.
116 Cf. United States v. Austin Radiological Ass’n, No. A-10-CV-914-AWA, 2013 WL 1136668, at *5
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2013) (noting “it is clear that documents retained by its compliance officer are subject to
discovery”); United States ex rel. Frazier v. IASIS Health Care Corp., No. 2:05-cv-766-RCJ, 2012 WL
130332, at *11 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2012) (holding that reports were protected under attorney–client privilege
because the reports were not created for the purpose of compliance review).
117 Conway, supra note 111.
118 See Super Tire Eng’g Co. v. Bandag Inc., 562 F. Supp. 439, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting that the
communication’s primary purpose must be to gain or provide legal advice in order to assert privilege, and
cannot be sought primarily for business advice).
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narrow interpretation of attorney–client privilege, this privilege is unlikely to
be a useful defense for health care providers attempting to protect compliance
audits.119 In fact, courts routinely have not granted attorney–client privilege in
these situations.120
If advice is equally sought for both business and legal reasons, courts are
unlikely to uphold the privilege because the advice was not primarily legal
advice.121 However, refusing to recognize advice that is both legal and business
results in an impractical distinction for health care entities because bifurcating
legal advice from business advice has proven especially difficult in the
corporate context of highly regulated fields like health care.122 Assigning a
binary label to advice is difficult because in-house counsel and compliance
teams serve cross-functional roles in both business strategy and regulatory
compliance.123 Health care entities, “operating in today’s labyrinthine legal and
regulatory environments,” seek advice from legal counsel on a wide variety of
issues, which are likely to include both legal and business related
implications.124
For example, suppose a health care entity is interested in instituting a new
cardiovascular outreach program, which is intended to provide a service to the
community and to increase profits for the health care entity.125 However, the
119 See United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that “[i]f
the document was prepared for purposes of simultaneous review by legal and non-legal personnel, it cannot be
said that the primary purpose of the document is to secure legal advice”). But see FLEPS, supra note 11, § 4
(noting there are ways to strategically maximize attorney–client privilege in a compliance audit).
120 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Baklid-Kunz v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 6:09-cv-1002-Orl-31TBS,
2012 WL 5415108, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2012) (holding that internal compliance audits performed by the
compliance department cannot be privileged under attorney–client exception because the audits were not
communications between legal counsel and for the purpose of seeking legal advice); Frazier, 2012 WL
130332, at *11 (holding that reports created for the purpose of compliance review are not protected under
attorney–client privilege).
121 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
122 See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2014 STATE OF COMPLIANCE SURVEY: WHAT IT MEANS TO BE
A “CHIEF” COMPLIANCE OFFICER: TODAY’S CHALLENGES, TOMORROW’S OPPORTUNITIES 2–3 [hereinafter
STATE OF COMPLIANCE SURVEY], https://www.pwc.com/mx/es/riesgos/archivo/2015-03-challenges.pdf.
123 Id. at 2–3.
124 In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 407, 424 (N.D. Ill. 2006); see also Puchley et al., supra
note 21, at 31 (“To gain a deeper understanding of the challenges facing their organizations, board members
are looking to audit compliance committees, general counsel, chief compliance officers (CCOs), and internal
audit executives to provide analysis and insight into the operational performance and regulatory risks that
affect their businesses.”).
125 See, e.g., Cardiovascular Outreach Program, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/departmentscenters/cardiovascular-diseases/overview/specialty-groups/cardiovascular-outreach-program (last visited Feb.
29, 2016).
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program may also trigger AKS, for example, because of claims that the
program spurs overutilization or medically unnecessary services. When the
health care entity seeks advice from counsel, an attorney is likely to give
business advice on how to structure the program to minimize costs and
maximize profits, as well as how to avoid fraud and abuse violations.
Conversely, many compliance officers are not attorneys and, therefore, cannot
give protected legal advice, even though these persons are highly
knowledgeable about the law and regulatory compliance.126
While compliance has significant legal implications and requires legal
analysis, compliance serves a role in a corporation distinct from that that of
their general counsel counterparts. In fact, the OIG has strongly encouraged
separation of compliance programs from the health care entity’s general
counsel because an independent compliance program helps “ensure
independent and objective legal review and financial analyses of the
institution’s compliance efforts and activities.”127 Compliance officers “should
be charged with and empowered to reveal issues—and may even advocate
disclosing to, and cooperating with, the government in certain instances,”
while the general counsel’s role should be “to rigorously defend the
company.”128 Because of the different and sometimes conflicting goals of
counsel and compliance, there is a significant conflict of interest concern.129
126 Even compliance officers who are licensed attorneys may not be able to give protected legal advice
through their capacity as a compliance officer; licensed attorneys may only give protected legal advice through
their capacity as an attorney. See United States ex rel. Frazier v. IASIS Health Care Corp., No. 2:05-cv-766RCJ, 2012 WL 130332, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2012) (finding that a Chief Compliance Officer, who was
also a licensed attorney, was not acting in his legal capacity and therefore communication was not protected
under attorney–client privilege, even though he worked closely with the Legal Department and held himself
out “to internal and external audiences as being among the legal counsel employed by the company”).
127 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
TO CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: A RESOURCE FOR HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 1
(2004) [hereinafter OIG INTEGRATED APPROACH TO CORPORATE COMPLIANCE] (quoting Compliance Program
Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 8,987, 8,993 n.35 (1998)); see also STATE OF COMPLIANCE SURVEY,
supra note 122, at 11 (“Federal guidelines aside, there’s an inherent difference between the roles of [Chief
Compliance Officer] and general counsel.”).
128 STATE OF COMPLIANCE SURVEY, supra note 122, at 11 (emphasis added); see also OIG INTEGRATED
APPROACH TO CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra note 127, at 2–3 (noting that General Counsel has “the primary
responsibility for assuring an effective legal compliance system” but that a Chief Compliance Officer has the
“primary functional responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the compliance and ethics program”
(quoting JAMES H. CHEEK ET AL., REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY (2003))).
129 Or, as Iowa Representative Charles Grassley more colorfully noted, when an individual is both
General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer, “[i]t doesn’t take a pig farmer from Iowa to smell the stench
of conflict in that arrangement.” Chuck Grassley, Grassley Investigates Tenet Healthcare’s Use of Federal Tax
Dollars (Sept. 7, 2003), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-investigates-tenet-
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This concern is likely to lead to conflicting goals and therefore supports the
need for a compliance privilege in order to protect the unique differences
between compliance and general counsel.130
The current application of attorney–client privilege discourages health care
organizations from keeping compliance and legal roles fully distinct because
the only privilege currently available is through an attorney acting in a legal
capacity.131 The lack of a compliance privilege creates an unjustified
inconsistency when advice from a lawyer creates a privilege, but the same
advice from a just-as-qualified compliance officer is not protected under the
currently recognized privileges.132 Health care entities should be encouraged to
implement an independent and stand-alone role for compliance that is
completely separate from general counsel. Therefore, a privilege for internal
compliance auditing may incentivize proper reliance on compliance, rather
than general counsel, for compliance related issues.
C. Peer Review Privilege Has Advanced Patient Safety and Quality
In the health care context, peer review is the process that engages health
care providers and other medical personnel to analyze critically how health
care activities are performed in order to decrease medical error and improve
overall quality.133 Sometimes called Quality Improvement Privilege, these peer
review processes may include root cause analyses,134 aggregation and analysis

healthcares-use-federal-tax-dollars (reproducing Letter from Charles Grassley, Chairman of the Comm. on
Finance, to Trevor Fetter, Acting Chief Exec. Officer and President of Tenet Healthcare Corp. (Sept. 7, 2003)).
130 STATE OF COMPLIANCE SURVEY, supra note 122, at 11.
131 See Jonathan Sack, When Is an Internal Investigation Not Privileged?, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2014, 4:26
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2014/04/16/when-is-an-internal-investigation-not-privileged/ (noting
that a “recent decision by U.S. District Judge James S. Gwin in the District of Columbia shows that a
company’s answer to [whether compliance staff or in-house legal counsel should look into potential
misconduct] will affect whether the investigation is subject to the attorney–client privilege” and further noting
that “a company’s internal compliance function is distinct from its legal one, and investigations conducted
pursuant to a compliance function by compliance personnel will not be viewed as privileged”).
132 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 797 (E.D. La. 2007) (noting the
difficulties in applying attorney–client privilege to health care because of the “uniquely regulated nature” of
the industry and “the role that in-house counsel has been given in the [company’s] decision-making process”).
133 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Kohlberg, The Medical Peer Review Privilege: A Linchpin for Patient Safety
Measures, 86 MASS. L. REV. 157, 157–58 (2002) (describing medical peer review privilege); Kathryn Leaman,
Let’s Give Them Something to Talk About: How the PSQIA May Provide Federal Privilege and Confidentiality
Protections to the Medical Peer Review Process, 11 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 177, 179–80 (2007) (describing
medical peer review privilege and predicting how the PSQIA will likely impact the medical peer review
process).
134 See infra note 185 and accompanying text.

PARDUE GALLEYSPROOFS2

1162

4/18/2016 2:26 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1139

of patient safety data,135 and conversations with health care providers.136 To
promote candid discussion, a peer review privilege encourages frank dialogue
on issues that health care providers may otherwise be reluctant to openly
discuss for fear of potential liability.137 The following Part describes a specific
federal peer review privilege, the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act
of 2005 and explores how courts have interpreted this privilege.
IV. FEDERAL PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE IN ACTION: THE PATIENT SAFETY AND
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
Congress enacted a new peer review federal privilege within the health care
setting with the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005
(PSQIA).138 The PSQIA encourages individual health care entities to create
internal reporting systems for patient safety events139 to identify and to address
proactively systematic risks to health and safety by protecting specific analyses
from discovery in future litigation.140 This “systemic review of error”
recognizes the relationship between effective ongoing oversight and
improvement of health care quality.141
This Part will first discuss the events leading up to the PSQIA, most
notably the recognition that entities were reluctant to collect safety data for
fear of potential liability. Second, the Part will discuss how the privilege has
significantly expanded patient safety data collection, which in turn has
improved patient health. Finally, this Part will discuss the limitations of the
PSQIA privilege.
A. A Culture of Fear: Before the PSQIA Protected Patient Safety Data
Before the PSQIA was enacted, the medical community and legislators
recognized that health care providers were very reluctant to report errors
beyond what they were legally required to report for fear disclosures would be
135

See infra Part V.A.1.
See, e.g., Leaman, supra note 133, at 197–98.
137 See, e.g., Kohlberg, supra note 133, at 157.
138 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22 (2012).
139 “Patient safety events” is a broad term applicable to any event or action that results in a worsened
patient outcome and often results from a preventable medical mistake or error. See NAT’L QUALITY FORUM,
PATIENT SAFETY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (2009), https://www.qualityforum.org/Topics/Safety_
Definitions.aspx.
140 Frederick Levy et al., The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005: Preventing Error and
Promoting Patient Safety, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 397, 397 (2010).
141 Id. at 407.
136
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used against them in legal and regulatory proceedings.142 To address this
problem and incentivize voluntary reporting, the PSQIA established a federal
privilege for data, reports, and analysis conducted through a patient safety
evaluation system (PSES).143 A PSES is not only the event reporting
mechanism, but the entire system of patient safety and quality improvement
data collection, event reporting, committee activities, peer review, and board
reporting that is conducted to send information to a patient safety organization
(PSO).144 The data collected in a PSES is sent to an independent PSO, which
aggregates data from multiple health care entities and provides meaningful
analysis and feedback on common safety issues and recommendations to
prevent future occurrences.145
Although courts are usually hesitant to expand privileges, the judiciary has
generally recognized the strong public interest in maintaining this peer review
privilege.146 In fact, most state courts have determined that private and public
interests are served by the medical peer review privilege because the hospital’s
review process depends on upholding confidentiality.147
Another notable aspect of the federal PSQIA privilege is that it creates a
“floor,” allowing states to grant more privilege than PSQIA provides, but states

142

See id. at 399.
See id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 3.20 (2010).
144 See ECRI INST. PSO, PSES PATHWAY: A TOOLKIT TO GUIDE THE DEFINITION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND
MANAGEMENT OF A PSES 23 (2013) (“While event and incident reports and associated analysis may be the
most common elements of a PSES, organizations are encouraged to think more expansively about the breadth
of safety and quality information and analysis within the organization. The [omitted] diagram . . . shows that a
PSES potentially traverses the organizational hierarchy, drawing on content from the board of directors to the
front line.”).
145 See Kelly G. Dunberg, Note, Just What the Doctor Ordered? How the Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act May Cure Florida’s Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents (Amendment
7), 64 FLA. L. REV. 513, 514 (2012) (noting that by analyzing and aggregating data submitted to PSOs, “PSOs
foster an environment in which providers can learn from their mistakes and the mistakes of others”).
146 See, e.g., Veith v. Portage Cty., No. 5:11CV2542, 2012 WL 4850197, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 11, 2012)
(noting that “without a peer review privilege, physicians will be discouraged from participating in the full and
frank expression of opinion that is essential if peer review is to fulfill its vital role in advancing the quality of
medical care” (quoting Sevilla v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1060 (N.D. Ill. 2012)); Francis v.
United States, No. 09 Civ. 4004(GBD)(KNF), 2011 WL 2224905, at *4–7 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2011). The
court held that PSQIA did not protect the review documents because the documents were not provided to a
PSO, but the court also held that documents provided to the Department of Health met many of the same
qualifying criteria for PSOs and performed similar functions. Id. at *6. The court found Congress’s intent was
to promote broad protection and therefore that recognizing a medical peer review privilege in the Federal Tort
Claim Act would advance Congress’s goal of promoting peer preview to improve quality of care. Id. at *6–7.
147 See Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *5; Ghazal Sharifi, Is the Door Open or Closed? Evaluating the
Future of the Federal Medical Peer-Review Privilege, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 561, 563–65 (2009).
143
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cannot take away any protections afforded by PSQIA.148 When states provide
for more privileges than the PSQIA, federal courts will generally follow state
law.149
B. A National Success Story: How the PSQIA Privilege Improves Safety
Since the PSQIA privilege was enacted, there are numerous examples
where hospitals have used data, previously not collected because of the lack of
legal protections, to improve quality and safety.150 For example, after
collecting data on medical chart errors, hospitals participating in one PSO
suggested all hospital professionals stop using certain abbreviations on medical
records because the abbreviations were too similar and were easily misread.151
The privilege is not only useful in analyzing previous errors that occurred,
including those resulting in harm to patients. It also protects analyses of “near
misses,” thus preventing errors that almost happened from ever occurring in
the future.152 There are many examples of how the privilege prevents errors
that almost happened from actually happening in the future. The Joint
148 Many states extend the privilege to internal reporting and do not require data be sent to a PSO. See,
e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-2102 (West 2003) (“All information, interviews, reports, statements,
memoranda . . . of a health care practitioner’s professional competence, or other data of . . . committees . . .
used in the course of internal quality control or of medical study for the purpose of reducing morbidity or
mortality, or for improving patient care . . . shall be privileged . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-272 (West
2015) (information collected by an internal Quality Improvement Committee is privileged). But see, e.g.,
Memorandum and Order, Morgan v. Cmty. Med. Ctr. Healthcare Sys., No. 2008 CV 4859, at *6 (Ct. Com. Pl.
2010) (narrowly interpreting PSQIA privilege to mean that “if any document is prepared or created for any
other or additional purpose,” the document loses all privileges and protection from discovery).
149 See FED. R. EVID. 501 (providing that “in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or
defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision”); see also Warren v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., No. 09CV-3512, 2013 WL 5835771, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2013) (upholding state privilege, acknowledging that a
“strong policy of comity between state and federal sovereignties impels federal courts to recognize state
privileges where this can be accomplished at no substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy”).
150 MHA KEYSTONE CTR., PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 10 (2013)
(discussing specific initiatives to improve pressure ulcers and adverse drug events, and an analysis on falls that
identified “key contributing factors to better prevent future occurrences”).
151 There is significant anecdotal evidence suggesting patient safety improvements. See, e.g., id.; Brief for
the Joint Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant Norton Hospital, Inc.’s Interpretation of the
Patient Safety Act at 6, Norton Hosps., Inc. v. Cunningham, No. 2012-SC-000604 (Ky. Oct. 26, 2012)
[hereinafter JC Amicus Brief]. Additionally, in January 2010, the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) issued a report to Congress explaining it was too early in the implementation process to fully evaluate
the PSQIA’s effectiveness. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-281, PATIENT SAFETY ACT: HHS IS
IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING THE ACT, SO ITS EFFECTIVENESS CANNOT YET BE EVALUATED (2010). This
is because, although the PSQIA was signed into law in 2005, the implementation of the rule only became
effective in 2009. See Levy et al., supra note 140, at 407.
152 JC Amicus Brief, supra note 151, at 6.
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Commission, a not-for-profit corporation that accredits health care
organizations, describes how this type of prevention occurs:
For example, as has happened, a physician may accidentally misplace
a decimal point when entering a medication order in a patient’s chart.
A nurse might catch the inadvertent error, the physician would
correct the error, and no harm would come to the patient. But the
same error could easily occur again, and this time, another nurse
might administer the medication to the patient, resulting in serious
harm. In the new world of patient safety organizations, the hospital
would be able to submit the ‘near miss’ to the patient safety
organization without fear of creating evidence that could be used
against the hospital or the individuals involved. The patient safety
organization would analyze the near miss event, along with other
similar events submitted by other hospitals, and develop and
disseminate recommendations, protocols, or feedback regarding the
best way to avoid misplaced decimals points in this type of
medication order.153

By creating an environment where potential errors are reported and openly
discussed, without fear of retribution or legal consequence, new data is being
collected and shared to improve the health care system.
C. Privilege Does Not Create Blanket Immunity: Finding the Right Balance
Between Privilege and Discovery
While the PSQIA promotes a broad privilege, the Act does not protect the
underlying data, medical records, or data already required to be reported to
agencies by law.154 For example, an error analysis report would be protected
from discovery, but the individual medical, billing, or discharge records used
to create the report would not be privileged under the PSQIA.155
Protecting analyses while ensuring the availability of underlying
documents in discovery promotes a proper balance between privilege and
discovery of evidence. In a senate floor speech prior to passing the PSQIA, the
late-Senator Edward Kennedy discussed this careful balance:

153

Id. at 10.
See Levy et al., supra note 140, at 407–11.
155 See id. at 411; see also Francis v. United States, No. 09-Civ.-4004(GBD)(KNF), at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May
31, 2011) (holding that a doctor’s report and the hospital’s plan of correction were protected from disclosure,
but chronologies were not protected because they included no analysis and therefore not subject to the
privilege).
154
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The Institute [of Medicine] recommended that health care
professionals should be encouraged to report medical errors, without
fearing that their reports will be used against them. Our legislation
implements this sensible recommendation by establishing patient
safety organizations to analyze medical errors and recommend ways
to avoid them in the future. . . .
Drawing the boundaries of this privilege requires a careful
balance[.] . . . The bill is intended to make medical professionals feel
secure in reporting errors without fear of punishment, and it is right
to do so. But the bill tries to do so carefully, so that is it does not
accidentally shield persons who have negligently or intentionally
caused harm to patients.156

The PSQIA does not create blanket immunity for health care providers.157
Rather, as Senator Kennedy stressed, PSQIA’s intention is to facilitate a
medical environment where well-intentioned professionals are able to candidly
report, analyze, and share issues with each other in order to improve the health
care system.
The PSQIA balancing concept between privileged information for quality
improvement and disclosures for litigation provides a valuable lens to explore
how compliance could be improved if a similar privilege were enacted. The
increase in compliance facilitated by a privilege is likely to outweigh the need
for the information to be discoverable in potential litigation. The following
Part compares data collection under the PSQIA and compliance auditing under
this analysis.
V. A CALL FOR REFORM: COMPARISONS BETWEEN PSQIA DATA COLLECTION
AND COMPLIANCE AUDITS
The public policy reasoning for enacting the PSQIA and the subsequent
improvement of patient safety provides a compelling argument to recognize a
similar privilege for health care compliance audits. Before PSQIA was
enacted, hospitals “historically took an adversarial and secretive approach to

156

JC Amicus Brief, supra note 151, at 11 (citing 151 CONG. REC. 16,763, 16,892 (2005) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy)).
157 See Levy et al., supra note 140, at 411 (noting that “[n]otwithstanding the [PSQIA’s] strong protection
for [patient safety work product], statutory limitations curtail the types of records and information that qualify
as PSWP” including “medical, billing, and discharge records, along with any other original patient or provider
record”).
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lawsuits and error.”158 But, after the PSQIA was implemented, providing
confidentiality to internal error analysis promoted greater openness,
transparency, and willingness to candidly discuss errors and areas of potential
risk.159
However, there are differences between compliance audits and patient
safety data collection that present challenges to developing a compliance
privilege. This Part will first discuss the differences between patient safety data
collection under the PSQIA and compliance auditing and will then explore
how the two systems are similar.
A. Overcoming Challenges: Why Differences Between Patient Safety Data
Collection and Compliance Auditing Are Ultimately Immaterial
There are two distinct differences between patient safety privilege and the
proposed compliance privilege. First, the PSQIA only recognizes a privilege
for safety data that is submitted to a third-party patient safety organization.
Second, health care entities generally assert the patient safety privilege in
medical malpractice litigation, which is usually an individual, non-government
plaintiff, while a compliance privilege would most likely be asserted in FCA
actions where the government is plaintiff. This Part will conclude that the two
differences may create challenges for establishing a compliance privilege, but
those differences ultimately will not outweigh the predicted benefits of the
compliance privilege.
1. Data Submission to Third Parties and the Utility of Data Aggregation
Although significant similarities exist between patient safety data collection
and reporting and compliance auditing, the two self-scrutiny activities are not
perfectly analogous. PSQIA privilege requires information to be sent
eventually to a third party, a PSO, and does not protect reports that are
collected only for internal purposes.160 However, many states recognize an
extended privilege to internal quality reports that are not sent to outside
organizations.161 Additionally, patient safety data can be extremely useful in

158

Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for Medical Malpractice Reform, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1224, 1230

(2013).
159
160
161

Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(a)–(c) (2012); 42 C.F.R. §§ 3.204(a), 3.206(a) (2010).
See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
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the aggregate, especially for smaller hospitals that may not have enough data to
easily identify patient safety trends.162
It remains unclear whether compliance reporting will be useful in the
aggregate, and therefore remains uncertain whether health care entities will
greatly benefit from aggregate sharing. However, there would be an expected
benefit if health care entities were able to candidly discuss problem-solving
strategies with other health care entities in a protected environment. For
example, if a health care entity’s audit revealed a potential issue with AKS
regarding durable medical equipment vendors, it is likely other health care
entities may have experienced a similar issue and could give valuable advice
on how to structure agreements to avoid AKS violations. Unfortunately, it is
extremely unlikely that health care entities will engage discussions with other
entities without legal protections in place. Providing a privilege to protect such
information is likely to encourage health care entities to candidly discuss issues
internally and with other entities and promote consistent interpretation of
requirements and collaborative problem solving.
2. The Government as Plaintiff and the Differences in Potential Litigation
Recoveries
The government as plaintiff is significant for two reasons. First, the FCA
imposes considerable civil penalties that are not generally associated with
patient safety events that may give rise to medical malpractice cases.163
Second, the government may be more reluctant to expand privilege for
compliance than it was for patient safety because a compliance audit privilege
could impact the government’s ability to bring FCA actions.164
162 Patient Safety Organization (PSO) Program: Frequently Asked Questions, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE
RES. & QUALITY, https://www.pso.ahrq.gov/faq#BenefitstoHealthcareProviders (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
163 Medical malpractice damages are often limited under state laws, while FCA violations automatically
allow for treble damages. See Andrew W. Schilling, Ross E. Morrison & Michelle L. Rogers, FCA Allows
Treble Damages—‘But Treble What?,’ LAW360 (Mar. 26, 2013, 11:22 AM), http://www.buckleysandler.
com/uploads/36/doc/FCA%20Allows%20Treble%20Damages.pdf (discussing how the government calculates
treble damages); Paul J. Passanante & Dawn Mefford, The Effect of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice, 61 J.
MO. B. 236, 241 (2005) (noting that while medical malpractice damages may vary from state to state, there are
generally “three types of damages that may be awarded to a plaintiff . . . economic damages, non-economic
damages and punitive damages”).
164 See Keith D. Barber, David B. Honig & Neal A. Cooper, Prolific Plaintiffs or Rabid Relators? Recent
Developments in False Claims Act Litigation, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 135, 161 (2004) (noting that “[o]ne of
the most disturbing trends in false claims law for health care providers has been the filing of general
allegations by qui tam relators who hope to create a case through the discovery process . . . which can include
every claim submitted to Medicare or Medicaid over a six-year period”).
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Significant financial risk gives entities a strong incentive to be proactive in
preventing violations, which may not be as significant in individual medical
malpractice cases.165 One could argue that the financial risk imposed by the
FCA is already adequate encouragement for entities to be compliant. For
example, in medical malpractice cases, the mean award ranges from $199,000
to $262,000, subject to whether state law imposes caps on noneconomic
damages.166 In comparison, mandatory per-claim penalties for an FCA
violation can mean that “one error or misinterpretation can result in millions of
dollars in penalties under the Act.”167 This financial risk provides a significant
incentive for health care entities to investigate possible violations.168
However, while the threat of litigating a FCA case does provide a financial
incentive for hospitals to be compliant, other financial factors may hinder
compliance efforts. Given that many hospitals operate on a 2% profit
margin,169 a risk analysis may show that the cost to develop more robust
internal compliance auditing systems does not outweigh the risk of litigating,
especially if the audit findings will be discoverable and possibly used against
them. This analysis may ultimately encourage hospitals to spend their
resources in other areas.
The other reason that the government as plaintiff may hinder Congress
from recognizing a compliance audit privilege is the government’s interest in
settling or litigating against health care entities in FCA actions. Unlike medical
malpractice cases, where the government has no financial interest, the
government has a significant financial interest in FCA actions. The
government’s financial interest could impede efforts to recognize a compliance
privilege if the government views the compliance privilege as a barrier to bring
suit against FCA violators.
Conversely, the government also has a financial incentive to promote
internal compliance auditing and continued improvements to system-wide
165

See Schilling et al., supra note 163.
Ronen Avraham, An Empirical Study on the Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical Malpractice
Settlement Payments, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S183, S210 (2007) (“[T]he mean (median) award of [medical
malpractice] cases not subject to caps is $262,000 ($132,000), whereas the mean (median) award of [medical
malpractice] cases subject to caps is only $199,000 ($84,000).”).
167 Stephanie L. Trunk, Note, Sounding the Death Toll for Health Care Providers: How the Civil False
Claims Act Has a Punitive Effect and Why the Act Warrants Reform of Its Damages and Penalties Provision,
71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 159, 164 (2003).
168 Id.
169 Improving Operating Margins Requires More Than Cost Reduction, VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN.,
https://www.vha.com/expertise/Pages/OperatingMargins.aspx (last visited Feb. 29, 2016).
166
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compliance. Many chief compliance officers acknowledge that, although
compliance should be “everyone’s responsibility,” many individuals are very
fearful to report any potential violations.170 Greater privilege may lead to
greater compliance, demonstrated by the PSQIA privilege, and thus fewer
violations of federal regulations.
However, as likely as the increase in compliance prompted by the greater
privilege, some believe that greater privilege may lead to greater
noncompliance, if hospitals believe they can “hide” behind the privilege and
intentionally defraud the government.171 While this result is possible, it is
unlikely for several reasons. First, similar to PSQIA, the compliance audit
privilege would not extend to the underlying facts and data. Therefore, any
repayment data or medical records would still be discoverable. Second, this
privilege would not interfere with current government auditing and required
data reporting; the only information this privilege would protect from
government interference or discovery would be investigations conducted for
the purpose of improving quality and compliance. Thus, narrowing the
privilege to encompass just compliance audits may be sufficient to prevent
protection of purposeful fraud or promote negligent behaviors.
B. Justifying a New Privilege: Similarities Between Patient Safety Data
Collection and Compliance Auditing
Although the incentives for compliance may be different from a patient
safety evaluation system, there are many structural similarities between the two
programs that suggest many of the benefits associated with the PSQIA
privilege would also be seen in a compliance privilege. This section predicts
several situations where a compliance audit privilege could improve regulatory
compliance.
1. Events with Concurrent Patient Safety and Compliance Implications
The same event often carries both patient safety and compliance
implications. For example, a facility may discover that a patient does not have
a suspected diagnosis. Billing codes are established through a payment system
called “diagnostically related groups” (DRGs), which CMS reimburses through
the same bundled payments for each patient with the same DRG for all

170
171

STATE OF COMPLIANCE SURVEY, supra note 122, at 3.
See Kaisersatt, supra note 44, at 421–22.
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services rendered.172 As a result, if a patient’s DRG is assigned, billed, and
collected, but a later compliance review determines the wrong DRG was used,
the entity must refund CMS for payment for services rendered under the
incorrect DRG and re-bill CMS under the correct DRG.173 Since this situation
impacts the patient’s quality of care and billing practices, it has patient safety
implications as well as compliance issues.
Similarly, overlap of compliance and safety issues occurs when a provider
bills for services beyond their scope of practice.174 If providers are performing
services they are not legally empowered to perform, there could be patient
safety implications.175 A health care entity should investigate the scope of
practice violations to improve safety, and also to investigate whether refunds to
the government are needed if such improper services were previously billed to
CMS. Even if the service was properly performed, there could still be a FCA
violation if the provider was outside his or her scope of practice.176
It is unreasonable to suggest that the same investigation should be protected
for a patient safety implication but not privileged for a compliance implication.
This incongruity will likely promote fear and confusion among health care
providers over what type of investigation is or is not protected and is therefore
likely to discourage robust investigations.
2. Reporting Near Misses
A PSQIA situation previously discussed encouraged health care providers
to report “near misses.”177 Because of the privilege, providers were willing to
report a misplaced decimal point when entering a medication order, even

172 See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Medicare’s Soviet Label, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Nov. 12, 2010, 6:00 AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/12/medicares-soviet-label/.
173 See Ruth Orcutt, Common Coding Errors and How to Prevent Them, CLINICAL-INSIGHTS (June 2009),
http://www.clinical-insights.com/resources-June09CodingErrors.html.
174 Generally, scope of practice refers to the “legislatively-defined spheres” of services and treatments
each type of health care provider is legally authorized to practice. Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between
Can and May in Health-Care Providers’ Scopes of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 19 YALE J. ON REG.
301, 303 (2002).
175 See generally AM. ASS’N OF CRITICAL-CARE NURSES, AACN SCOPE AND STANDARDS FOR ACUTE
CARE NURSE PRACTITIONER PRACTICE 9 (Linda Bell ed., 2012) (noting that a “consistent definition for the
[scope and standards for nurses] provides evidence to the public that the candidate meets established standards
of quality and patient safety, which includes demonstrated competence for advanced practice”).
176 See Gretchen Harper, Trust Me I’m a Doctor: The Struggle over Scope of Practice and Its Effect on
Health Care Fraud and Abuse, 15 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 237, 245 (2013).
177 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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though the issue was corrected before any potential safety event happened.178
Without reporting the problem, the same error could reoccur; however, now
the hospital can submit the near miss without fear of creating evidence that
could be used against the hospital.179 From this kind of safety data now being
collected, such a hospital can create recommendations, protocols, or feedback
on the best way to avoid this problem in the future.
This situation also occurs in the compliance context. One can easily
imagine a situation where unintentional upcoding almost occurs, but a coder
catches the problem before anything is billed.180 Currently, upcoding—
especially in long-term care—has been the focus on many qui tam lawsuits.181
Other similar errors could include writing the incorrect weight for a patient and
thus miscalculating the pain medicine or chemotherapy dosage. It is reasonable
to suggest these coding or miscalculation problems could be similar to the
medication decimal error in the above PSQIA example,182 and that a similar
PSQIA privilege for reporting this compliance information would be beneficial
to the health care entity and to ensure the government continues to receive
proper payment.
3. Never Events
Another situation where a compliance privilege also would promote open
communication and in depth investigational analysis when conducting a root
cause analysis for a “never event.”183 Never events are serious patient safety
178

See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
180 Upcoding is when an inaccurate billing code is assigned to a medical procedure or treatment, which
results in an improper, usually higher, government reimbursement. Leemore Dafny & David Dranove,
Regulatory Exploitation and Management Changes: Upcoding in the Hospital Industry, 52 J.L. & ECON. 223,
224 (2009).
181 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-04-10-00180, CODING TRENDS
OF MEDICARE EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES 13–15 (May 2012), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/
oei-04-10-00180.pdf. The report does not conclude that these billings are all false claims, but the increase in
billing higher-level codes is suspect.
182 In a broader context, upcoding can “move beyond simple billing errors to create actual overpayments
due to improper billing methods, possibly due to [electronic medical record] cloning or inappropriate use of
templates.” Robert A. Wade & Alex T. Krouse, EHRs, Upcoding, Overpayments, and the False Claims Act—
Understanding the Risks, 10 ABA HEALTH ESOURCE, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
aba_health_esource/2013-14/november/ehrs.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015); see also United States ex rel.
Keltner v. Lakeshore Med. Clinic, Ltd., No. 11-CV-00892, 2013 WL 1307013 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 28, 2013).
183 A root cause analysis is a method of problem solving that attempts to identify the underlying causes
that once removed, prevents the ultimate undesirable event from recurring. RCA is based on process
improvement and problem solving techniques. See, e.g., What is Root Cause Analysis (RCA)?, AM. SOC’Y FOR
179
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events that should never occur if proper preventative measures had been
implemented, such as a wrong-side surgery.184 To find out how such an event
happened, what went wrong,185 and to develop strategies to prevent the
problem from reoccurring, it is best to have a privilege to investigate. Because
hospitals cannot bill for never events,186 payment would have to be reimbursed
if it had previously been billed, thus creating a potential compliance issue.
These examples demonstrate that privilege promotes a culture of
compliance, resulting in an increased likelihood that a health care entity will
encourage people to report potential or known compliance violations. Once
reported, such a privilege not only makes that investigation more likely to
occur, but also makes it more likely that the investigation will be thorough,
honest, and effective. That investigation also will reveal if repayment to CMS
might be needed. While these situations are only hypothetical, it is reasonable
to predict that providing a privilege to certain types of compliance auditing
activity would encourage health care entities to conduct more systematic
reviews of their activities to ensure regulatory compliance. Moreover,
individuals may be more willing to share information with the compliance
department if they know that those discussions are privileged and the
individual can avoid being labeled a troublemaker or whistleblower.
VI. PROSPECTIVE OBSTACLES FOR COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
As a practical matter, employees and health care providers are likely to
engage more often with compliance officers than with in-house legal
counsel.187 Thus, the issue becomes what compliance officers are empowered
to do with compliance information shared with their department by personnel.
As previously discussed in Part V, a privilege will likely promote greater

QUALITY, http://asq.org/learn-about-quality/root-cause-analysis/overview/overview.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2015).
184 Patient Safety Primers: Never Events, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY,
http://psnet.ahrq.gov/primer.aspx?primerID=3 (last updated Dec. 2014).
185 Root cause analyses discourage focusing on what individual people may have done wrong because
often it is the processes that are broken. See Fay A. Rozovsky, Response to the Keynote: Who Cares About
Quality Measurement?, AHLA-PAPERS P06170104 (AHLA Seminar Materials June 18, 2001). By
understanding how processes can be improved, the entire system is strengthened and less vulnerable to human
error. Id.
186 NAT’L BUS. COAL. ON HEALTH, HEALTH CARE PURCHASER TOOLKIT: HOSPITAL-ACQUIRED
CONDITION PAYMENT POLICY 3 (2009) (noting a “Medicare policy in which it will no longer elevate payment
to reimburse for [never events]”).
187 See FLEPS, supra note 11.
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openness and information sharing, but a compliance privilege may also create
additional dilemmas.
For example, one could imagine a situation where a potential whistleblower
calls a compliance hotline to report a possible violation, the compliance office
analyzes the complaint, and then decides to hire outside counsel to do an
investigation. The outside counsel conducts an audit and concludes the
possible violation is not a risk and provides a report to the hospital.
Current law would likely uphold attorney–client privilege for this report
because the healthcare entity sought legal advice from an attorney.188
However, there are likely to be situations where the hospital would want to
share the good outcome and due diligence with the government and thus waive
the privilege for this document. This would be considered a subject matter
waiver.189 In a subject matter waiver, when an entity waives privilege, it is
unclear how broad that waiver is.190 This uncertainty creates a dilemma for
compliance auditing: if health care entities have a privilege for compliance
audits, sharing this information with the government, even if sharing may be
beneficial for the health care entity, could risk eliminating protection for other
privileged documents for which the entity had no intention of waiving
privilege. If courts interpret subject matter waiver broadly, subject matter
waivers may be so risky for entities that it could benefit the entity not to have a
privilege for compliance reports. If there is not a privilege, entities could share
their non-privileged compliance reports with the government and not risk
accidentally “opening the door” and thus waiving privilege on other currently
protected documents.191

188

See, e.g., id. § 4:4-3.
See, e.g., Ted S. Helwig & David S. Slovick, The Dilemma Remains: The Collateral Effect of
Disclosing Attorney-Client Privileged Communications and Attorney Work Product to Government Agencies,
26 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., May 2006, at 1, 1 (“Voluntary disclosure to a regulatory or criminal
authority may trigger serious consequences regarding the waiver of the privilege and the protection of pending
or anticipated private, civil litigation.”).
190 See, e.g., id. (“A dispute exists . . . over the viability of the so-called ‘selective waiver’ doctrine . . . .”).
191 “Opening the door” includes the possibility of waiving the compliance privilege to other documents
about the same subject matter, and also the possibility of opening the door to documents of the same subject
matter that are currently protected under privileges other than a compliance privilege.
189
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Unfortunately, the proposed compliance privilege discussed here does not
provide an easy solution for this quandary. One solution for a subject matter
waiver protection could be to explicitly legislate that waiving privilege on a
self-evaluative work product for compliance auditing does not waive any other
privileges. However, sole reliance on the language of a statute is risky because
statutes will always have some degree of ambiguity and will be subject to court
interpretation.192 While not explicitly discussing subject matter waiver, the
PSQIA does permit patient safety work product to be disclosed in certain
circumstances without losing its privilege.193 These circumstances include
voluntary disclosures to an accrediting body or to a government agency.194
Therefore, for a compliance privilege, Congress could explicitly legislate to
protect against subject matter waivers and thus fully recognize the importance
and benefits of such a compliance privilege.
CONCLUSION
The recent proliferation of regulations and the government’s aggressive
enforcement of those regulations against health care entities create strong
incentives for health care entities to become and to remain compliant with the
law. However, aggressive enforcement against these entities does not fully
ameliorate the problem of noncompliance because unintentional FCA
violations are better addressed through prevention, rather than punishment.
Until Congress acts, health care entities will continue to operate in an
environment of fear and uncertainty, which ultimately weakens the health care
system as a whole. Therefore, Congress must respond by enacting a limited
federal privilege for ongoing compliance audits. Such a privilege will provide

192
193
194

See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
42 C.F.R. § 3.206(b) (2015).
Id. § 3.206(b)(7)–(8).
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protection for robust compliance auditing, which will serve to create a culture
of openness within an individual health care entity and promote an efficient,
affordable, and effective national health care system.
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